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FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH AND ABORTION: DO
THEY HAVE A FUTURE TOGETHER?
INTRODUCTION
The year is 2001. Fetal Factory No. 998-59 has just received
its latest shipment of tissue from Nicarauga,' the location of the
newest fetal-farm-for-money establishment. The frozen fetal tissue
will be cloned and cultured into massive tissue cultures.2 From
here, the tissue will be transported to Tissue Bank No. 653-4. 3 To-
day, Transplant Team No. 312-1 is coming to withdraw three
ounces of brain tissue, gestated for ten to fourteen weeks. The
team will inject the brain tissue into the brain of an anonymous
adult, suffering with soon-to-be-extinct Parkinson's disease.4 The
fetal tissue cells will graft to the adult tissue, and produce
dopamine, the chemical lacking in Parkinson's patients.' To-
1. House member, John J. LaFalce, of New York, stated in the first session of
the 101st Congress that with the eight to ten million "sufferers of chronic or de-
generative diseases, demand [for fetal tissue] will soon outstrip supply. This can
only lead to... exploitation of poor and Third World women as fetal-organ farms
...." 135 CONG. REC. E4066, E4067, (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) (statement of John
J. LaFalce)(quoting Nathanson, Using Fetal Tissue Will Cost Unborn Lives,
USA Today, Nov. 3, 1989).
2. By cloning fetal tissue cells, one company can produce "enough cells from
one fetal pancreas to treat 20 adult diabetics." The company is aiming for a pro-
duction capacity of enough fetal pancreatic tissue to treat 15,000 diabetic patients
per year by 1991. The cost of each treatment will be $5,000. Note, Fetal Tissue
Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1079, 1085
(1988) (quoting Maugh, Use of Fetal Tissue Stirs Hot Debate, L.A. Times, Apr.
16, 1988 at 28, col. 4.)
3. "Studies on cryopreservation and thawing indicate[d] nearly complete sur-
vival of the rat fetal pancreas, permitting accumulation of large numbers of fetal
pancreases in a bank, being tissue-typed and used in compatible recipients." Dru-
gan, Evans and Evans, Fetal Organ and Xenograft Transplantation, 160 Am. J.
OBSTET. GYNECOL. 289, 291 (1989).
4. "Parkinson's disease may be the first human disease to be treated success-
fully through transplantation of fetal brain tissue . . . ." Id. at 291.
5. "Numerous reports spanning more than 100 years have established that
fetal brain-tissue grafts to host brain survive and may connect with the host
brain." Hoffer, Granholm, Stevens and Olson, Catecholamine-Containing Grafts
in Parkinsonism: Past and Present. 36 CLINICAL RESEARCH 189, 189 (1988).
6. In rat experimentation, "the histochemically detectable reinnervation of
host striatum by graft-derived dopamine nerve terminals release[d] transmitter
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morrow, the team is coming for three ounces of fetal pancreatic
tissue, gestated for nine weeks. The recipient suffers from diabe-
tes.7 After receiving the injection of fetal pancreatic tissue, the re-
cipient will be able to lead a normal life. Is this scenario an accu-
rate prediction?
The use of fetal tissue to treat diseases such as Parkinson's
disease and diabetes is in an experimental and very unsettled
state. Although scientists are making progress in fetal tissue exper-
imentation, they are finding themselves confronted with ethicists
claiming that the use of fetal tissues for transplantation is morally
wrong. The thought of injecting electively aborted fetuses into the
brain of another human being is troublesome to them. Societal at-
titudes towards abortion seem to determine societal attitudes to-
wards fetal tissue research. This Comment will examine fetal tissue
research as it relates to the issue of abortion. First, the Comment
discusses the current status of fetal tissue research. Second, the
Comment looks at the influence of abortion on fetal tissue re-
search, including constitutional and ethical issues. Third, the Com-
ment examines the future of fetal tissue research. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that the attitudes, opinions and laws con-
cerning abortion will play a major role in determining the future of
fetal tissue research.
FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH-ITS CURRENT STATUS
Fetal tissue research has not always been as controversial as it
is today. Scientists began experimenting with fetal tissue in the
1930's.1 Fetal tissue was used to develop the polio vaccine.' The
use of fetal cell lines to produce vaccinations was a generally ac-
cepted practice." ° Public opposition to the use of fetal tissue in
medical research.was minimal until the early 1970's when abortion
with time courses and magnitudes that [were] very similar to normal in areas of
host striatum adjacent to the graft .... ." Id. at 191.
7. Special Project, Bioethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Organ and Tissue
Transplantation, 26 Hous. L. REV. 955, 958 (1989)(quoting Hullet, Falany, Love,
Burlingham, Pan and Sollinger, Human Fetal Pancreas-A Potential Source for
Transplantation, 43 TRANSPLANTATION 18 (1987)).
8. Greely, Hanna, Johnson, Price, Weingarten and Raffin, Special Report,
The Ethical Use of Human Fetal Tissue in Medicine, 320 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
1093 (1989)[hereinafter Greely].
9. Id.
10. Id.
[Vol. 13:81
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was legalized.11 Having failed in the Supreme Court's Roe v.
Wade 2 decision, right-to-lifers feared that because abortions were
now legal, science would exploit the aborted fetuses by subjecting
them to inhumane experimentation. 3 The conflict between those
opposed to abortion and researchers continued to build. 4 The con-
flict exploded with the development of new uses for fetal tissue,
namely transplantations. 5 Injecting electively aborted fetal tissue
into the brain of another human being posed many questions
which have yet to be answered.
The government stepped into the picture by stopping federal
fetal tissue research.' 6 In 1988, the Assistant Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Dr. Robert Windom, issued a moratorium on
the use.of public funds for any fetal tissue research. 7 The morato-
rium was to be in effect until the fetal tissue research issue could
be examined further.'8 In response to the moratorium, the Na-
tional Institute of Health (NIH) appointed a special committee,
composed of doctors, lawyers, theologians, and ethicists to investi-
gate fetal tissue research. 19 Assistant Secretary Windom presented
the committee with eleven questions regarding the ethical and
public policy problems with fetal tissue research.2" After extensive
deliberation, the committee sent the director of NIH, James B.
Wyngaarden, a proposal for government regulation of fetal tissue
11. Gold and Lehrman, Fetal Research Under Fire: The Influence of Abor-
tion Politics, 21 FAM. PLANN. PERSPECT. 6, 7 (1989)(Fetal- tissue has been used as a
weapon in the war against abortion since 1973.)[hereinafter Gold].
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Gold, supra note 11, at 7.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Culliton, Panel Backs Fetal Tissue Research, 242 SCIENCE 1625 (1988).
See also, Hellerstein, Fetal Research and Fetal-tissue Research: Policy Debate
But No Resolution, 2 F.A.S.E.B.J. 3041, 3042 (1988) (In 1987, the National Insti-
tute of Health funded about $11.2 million of nontherapeutic fetal tissue research,
less than 0.2% of its overall budget.).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Culliton, Fetal Research Morally Acceptable, 241 SCIENCE 1593 (1988).
See also, Marwick, Fetal Tissue Study Panel Nears Conclusion, 260 J.A.M.A.
3108, 3109 (1988) (When asked by Assistant Secretary Windom whether an in-
duced abortion is of moral relevance to the decision to use the tissue for fetal
tissue research, the panel responded it was.).
20. To view the eleven questions, see Nadler, Fetal Tissue Transplantation,
143 A.J.D.C. 149 (1989).
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research.21 The proposal recommended removing the moratorium.22
The NIH unanimously approved the proposal and delivered it to
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 3 The
DHHS rejected the NIH proposal and extended the moratorium
indefinitely.24 The current status of fetal tissue research is there-
fore very uncertain.
A. Current Usage
Fetal transplantation experiments are underway for the treat-
ment of many diseases including sickle cell anemia, leukemia,
Huntington's chorea, cancer, and AIDS.25 Fetal tissue is being used
because it possesses three unique properties: (1) fetal tissue grows
rapidly (2) it is immunologically naive, and (3) it is very adaptable
to a changed environment.26 The most publicized experimental use
of the tissue is in treatment of Parkinson's disease. In 1988, Swed-
ish researchers implanted ventral mesenphalic brain tissue from
four eight to ten week old fetuses into the brains of two women
suffering from acute Parkinson's disease.27 The scientists reported
some small improvements in the motor functions of the women.2"
21. Culliton, supra note 16, at 1625. See also Annas and Elias, The Politics
of Transplantation of Human Fetal Tissue, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1079, 1080
(1989)(The panel concluded that the use of fetal tissue in research was acceptable
public policy because "abortion is legal . . . and the research in question is in-
tended to achieve significant goals.")[hereinafter Annas].
22. Marwick, Ban to Be Lifted on Research Use of Fetal Tissue?, 261
J.A.M.A. 342 (1989). Panelists agreed on keeping the decision, timing, and con-
duct of the abortion itself separate from the decision to provide any fetal tissue
for research. Proper and informed consent to use the fetal tissues must be ob-
tained from the pregnant woman, and the panelists have recommended steps to
prevent the commercialization of the tissues or the exploitation of the woman
undergoing an abortion. They also recommended that women donating fetal tis-
sue for research and clinical studies not be permitted to designate those to whom
these tissues should be given. Marwick, Fetal Tissue Study Panel Nears Conclu-
sion, 260 J.A.M.A. 3108, 3109 (1988).
23. Id.
24. See infra note 217.
25. Gold, supra note 11, at 7.
26. Greely, supra note 8, at 1093.
27. Lindvall, Gustavii, Astst, Lindholm, Rehncrona, Beandin, Widner, Bjor-
kluno, Leenders, Rothwell, Johnels, Steg, Frackowiak, Marsden, Freedman,
Hoffer, Seiger, Stromberg, Bygdeman and Olsen, Fetal Dopamine-Rich
Mesenphalic Grafts in Parkinson's Disease, 2 LANCET 1483 (1988)[hereinafter
Lindvall].
28. Id.
[Vol. 13:81
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They concluded that "ventral mesenphalic tissue obtained at elec-
tive abortions can be implanted into brains of immunosuppressed
Parkinsonian patients without major complications.29 However, no
improvements of therapeutic value to the patients have been ob-
served up to 6 months postoperatively."3 Currently in the United
State, fetal neural tissue transplantation has been successful in les-
sening symptoms in chemically induced Parkinson's disease in pri-
mates.a' Although favorable, these experiments have produced no
results of therapeutic value.32 Scientists must therefore conduct
much more research before determining whether treatment of Par-
kinson's disease with fetal tissue is feasible. 33
B. Current Federal Regetlation
In 1975, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (now the Department of Health and Human Services, herein-
after DHHS) adopted a set of regulations on fetal research which
apply to federally funded research on living fetuses. 4 The regula-
tions apply whether the fetus is viable or not. 5 The regulations
apply to "research, developments, and related activities involving.
. . the fetus. 3a6 The regulations require that any research activities
must meet the health needs of the mother or the fetus.3 7 The regu-
lations require that the risk to the fetus be minimal and that the
risk be the least possible for achieving the goals of the activity.3 .
"Minimal risk requires that the anticipated risks of the research be
no greater than those risks encountered in daily life or in routine
medical examinations. '3 9 In addition, the method used to abort the
29. Id.
30. Id. The doctors reported that "[iln patient 1 there has been a small but
significant bilateral improvement of arm-hand function tests and foot lifting, be-
ginning at about 3 months after transplantation. The improvement has been more
marked contralateral to the implanted side. The motor performance of patient 2
has been more variable, but at 6 months she is performing the tests significantly
more rapidly on both sides, with no obvious side difference. Id. at 1483.
31.. See generally, Sladek, Redmond and Roth, Transplantation of Fetal
Neurons in Primates, 36 CLINICAL RESEARCH 200 (1988).
32. Greely, supra note 8, at 1093.
33. Id.
34. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-46.211 (1989).
35. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1989).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1989).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(2) (1989).
38. Id.
39. Gold, supra note 11, at 8.
1990]
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fetus cannot pose any additional risk to the fetus or the mother in
the interest of research.4"
The DHHS regulations govern the activities towards fetuses,
ex utero.4' Before any activity covered in the regulations may be
undertaken, the researcher must determine whether or not the fe-
tus is viable.42 If the fetus is nonviable, the vital functions of the
fetus may not be artificially maintained. 3 Activities which end the
heartbeat or respirations of the fetus are prohibited.4 Also, the
purpose of the activity must be the development of important bi-
omedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by any other
means.45 The regulations further require that both the mother and
father consent to any research conducted on the fetus."
In 1985, Congress passed The Health Research Extension
Act. 7 This Act imposed further restrictions on fetal tissue re-
search. 8 The Act prohibits the Secretary of Health from support-
ing any research involving living fetuses for whom the viability has
not been determined. 9 The Act makes an exception to the rule if
the research is therapeutic to the fetus or will provide valuable bi-
omedical knowledge that cannot be obtained in any other way."
The Act further requires that "the risk standard . . . be the same
for fetuses which are intended to be aborted and fetuses which are
intended to be carried to-term."51
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(4) (1989).
41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1989).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(a) (1989). It is important to understand the difference
between a viable, a nonviable, and a dead fetus. A viable fetus is one that is "able,
after either spontaneous or induced delivery, to survive (given the benefit of avail-
able medical therapy) to the point of independently maintaining heartbeat and
respiration." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(d) (1989). A nonviable fetus is a fetus "ex utero
which, although living, is not viable." 45 C.F.R. §46.203(e) (1989). A dead fetus is
a fetus "ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activ-
ity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical
cord (if still attached)." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1989).
43. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b)(1) (1989).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(d) (1989).
47. The Health Research Extension Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C.A. § 289b (West
Supp. 1990).
48. King and Areen, Legal Regulation of Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 36
CLINICAL RESEARCH 205, 206 (1988). ,
49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 289g(a) (West Supp. 1990).
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 289g(b) (West Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 13:81
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The third set of existing federal regulations which affect fetal
tissue research is the National Organ Transplant Act.2 The Act
originally prohibited the transfer of organs in interstate commerce
for valuable consideration. 3 In June, 1988, Senator Gordon
Humphrey proposed amending the Act to include fetal organs and
tissues. 4 On June 17, 1988, Congress amended the National Organ
Transplant Act. 5 The Act's scope was extended to include fetal
tissues and organs.56 As a result, any sale of fetal tissues and or-
gans is prohibited.5
7
C. Current State Regulations
The Health Research Extension Act of 1985 allows the states
to determine for themselves whether research on fetuses is permis-
sible.58 The states' restrictions on research involving living fetuses
differ.59 Unlike the federal requirements, the state restrictions ap-
ply whether the research is publicly funded or not." Twenty-five
states have no regulations on fetal research." Others expressly reg-
ulate research on living fetuses only. 2 Arizona has the strictest
regulations. 3 Arizona's regulations prohibit any research on fe-
tuses, living or dead, unless strictly necessary to diagnose a disease
in the mother, and the fetus was aborted because of that disease.6 4
All fifty states have adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) which expressly includes dead fetuses. 5 Under this Act,
relatives may donate the fetal cadaver to a specified donee for re-
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West Supp. 1990).
53. Id.
54. 134 CONG. REC. S10131 (daily ed. July 27, 1988) (Humphrey Amendment
No. 2711).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (1990), amended by Organ Transplants Amend-
ment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-67, Title IV, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 3114 (1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201(b) (1989).
59. See King, supra note 48, at 206-207.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Special Project, Bioethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Organ and Tissue
Transplantation, 26 Hous. L. REV. 955, 975 (1989).
62. Id.
63. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986).
64. Id.
65. UNIFORM ANTOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-11, 8A U.L.A. 15-67 (West 1983) [cur-
rent version at §§ 1-16, 8A U.L.A. 7-27 (West Supp. 1990)].
1990]
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search, transplantation, or therapy. The donee may be an indi-
vidual, a hospital, a university, or a storage bank 7.6 The Act struc-
tures a hierarchy of persons who may consent to the donation."
The order of seniority is: the spouse, an adult child, either parent,
an adult sibling, a guardian or any other person authorized or
under obligation to dispose of the body.69 Only the person with the
highest seniority who is available can make the gift.70 If the donee
knows of either the decedent's objection or of the objection of a
member of the same or higher class, he cannot accept the dona-
tion. 7' In the case of a fetus, therefore, both parents must consent
to the donation of the fetus for research.72
THE INFLUENCE OF ABORTION
The availability of fetal tissue for research is dependent upon
the availability of abortions. An estimated 1.5 million electively in-
duced abortions are performed each year.73 This means that 1.5
million fetuses could feasibly be used each year in fetal tissue re-
search. The availability of abortions is dependent upon both con-
stitutional and ethical considerations. In determining the constitu-
tionality of abortion, courts have examined the mother's right to
privacy in the abortion decision.74 They have also examined the
legal status of a fetus as a person.75 Ethical issues regarding abor-
tion influence fetal tissue research, even though the courts have
been hesitant to discuss such issues. 6 Ethical issues arise because
those opposed to abortion are opposed to the use of fetal tissue
from induced abortions. 77 Resolution of these issues will have a di-
66. Id. at § 3, 8A U.L.A. 41 (1983)[current version at §6(a), 8A U.L.A. 21
(West Supp. 1990)].
67. Id.
68. Id. at § 2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34-35 (West 1983)[current versi6n at §3(a) 13-14
(West Supp. 1990)].
69. Id.
70. Id. at §2(b), 8A U.L.A. 34-35 (West 1983)[current version at § 3(b) 13-14
(West Supp. 1990)].
71. Id. at § 2(c), 8A U.L.A. 34-35 (West 1983)(current version at § 2(b)(3)
(1990)].
72. Id.
73. Robertson, Rights, Symbolism, and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue Trans-
plants, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Dec. 1988).
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Id. at 156-159.
76. See infra note 142.
77. Id.
[Vol. 13:81
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rect impact on the future of fetal research.
A. The Constitutional Issues
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that a woman has a right to privacy in
deciding whether or not to abort her child.7" The right is not abso-
lute. Within the first trimester, a woman may abort for any rea-
son.79 After the first trimester, the State acquires a compelling in-
terest in protecting maternal health. 0 This compelling interest in
maternal health arises because abortion procedures used in this
state of pregnancy pose more of a risk to the mother than those
used in the first trimester.8 '
The Court rejected the notion that any fetus is a person
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment.8 2 The Court
said that it would begin to recognize the rights of the fetus when it
reached viability.8 3 It is at this point that the state acquires a com-
pelling interest in protecting the potential life. ' Viability is de-
fined as the point at which the fetus is capable of independent sur-
vival.8 5 Past the point of viability, a state may constitutionally
prohibit abortion, and thus constitutionally prohibit fetal research
on viable fetuses.8
The Supreme. Court reexamined the trimester approach
adopted by Roe in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.87 calling
it "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." 8s The Court
did not suggest an alternative to the Roe trimester framework. 9 It
did, however, approve of Missouri's statutory approach to regulat-
ing abortion.9
The Missouri statute at issue in Webster stated that "[tihe
78. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
79. Id. at 163, 164.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 157-158.
83. Id. at 163.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 163, .164.
86. Id.
87. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
88. Id. at 3056 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
89. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
90. Id.
1990]
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life of each human being begins at conception" and "unborn chil-
dren have protectible interests in life, health and well being."91
The statute further provided that if a physician believes the fetus
may be older than twenty weeks, he must perform tests to deter-
mine in utero the viability of the fetus.92 The Supreme Court re-
fused to pass upon the constitutionality of the "life begins at con-
ception" language. 3 However, it held the requirement of an
examination of the fetus by the physician to determine its viability
to be a permissible promotion of the state's interest in protecting
potential life. 4 With the Webster decision, the Supreme Court
sanctioned the use of fetal viability as a point at which a state gov-
ernment can regulate abortion.9 5
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, used the maternal right to privacy to strike down a
Louisiana statute prohibiting nontherapeutic research on any live
or dead fetus in Margaret S. v. Treen (Margaret II).91 Prohibiting
research on the fetus to determine the possibility of defects in fu-
ture pregnancies denied the woman her fundamental right to make
an informed decision on whether to abort a later pregnancy.97 The
court further held that because the state's interest in preserving
fetal life ended at fetal death, the statute was an arbitrary in-
fringement on the physician's right to conduct research. 8 The case
implies that the state's interest must be compelling before it can
prohibit any fetal research that will help a woman to make future
reproductive choices.9
91. Id. at 3047.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3050.
94. Id. at 3055-3058. Senator Metzenbaum stated in the 101st Congress, First
Session, on Nov. 17, 1989 that a "counterattack on women's rights" was imposed
by the Court in Webster when it suggested "that the right of privacy announced
in Roe and upheld in subsequent cases is not of the status of other fundamental
rights." 135 CONG. REC. S16025 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989)(statement of Senator
Metzenbaum).
95. Id.
96. Margaret S. v. Treen (Margaret II), 597 F. Supp. 636, 671-76 (E.D. La.
1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th
Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 673.
98. Id. at 672.
99. Note, supra note 2, at 1097.
[ ol. 13:81
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B. The Ethical Issues
The ethical issues of fetal tissue research are intertwined with
the ethical issues of abortion. Persons opposed to abortions object
to the use of electively aborted fetuses in fetal tissue research.
What are their objections? And what are the ethical issues which
arise from abortion's influence on fetal tissue research?
1. Objections to the Use of Fetuses From Elective Abortions
The use of fetal tissue is not in itself objectionable.' ° Once the
fetus has died, it is just like any other cadaver which might be
used in medical research or transplantation procedures.' In fact,
the use of fetal tissue from spontaneous abortion is approved of
generally. ' 2 If all of the needed research and transplantation pro-
cedures could be carried out from the spontaneously aborted fe-
tuses, there would be little if any objection. 3 Unfortunately, spon-
taneously aborted fetuses are often chromosomally defective,
diseased, or infected with microorganisms.' 4 Also, spontaneous
abortions often occur under uncontrolled conditions making the
collection of tissue impossible.' Therefore, science has turned to
electively aborted fetuses for its research.0 6 Herein lies the prob-
lem.'07 Is the use of fetal tissue from an elective abortion complic-
ity in an immoral act? Will the medical benefits which could result
legitimize and encourage abortions?
a. Complicity in an Immoral Act
Those opposed to abortion feel that the electively aborted fe-
tuses are morally tainted.0 8 The argument is that the transplanta-
tion of fetal tissue is complicity in an immoral act.0 9 Professor
John Robertson, a member of the NIH Panel on Fetal Tissue
100. Greely, supra note 8, at 1094.
101. Id. at 1094.
102. Lowy, Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Time for a Canadian Policy, 141
C.M.A.J. 1227, 1228 (1989).
103. Id.
104. Annas and Elias, The Politics of Transplantation of Human Fetal Tis-
sue, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1079, 1081 (1989) [hereinafter Annas].
105. Special Project, supra note 61, at 960.
106. Id. at 961.
107. See Greely, supra note 8.
108. Dickson, Fetal Tissue Transplants Win U.K. Approval, 245 SCIENCE
464 (1989).
109. Robertson, supra note 73, at 6.
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Transplantation Research rebuts the complicity argument with a
homicide analogy. 110 Robertson contends that one would never ar-
gue that the surgeon who transplants organs from a murder victim
into a recipient is an accomplice in the murder."' As long as trans-
plantation and abortion procedures are kept entirely separate, the
surgeon injecting the fetal tissue into the recipient is not an ac-
complice in the abortion." 2 Benefitting from an immoral act is not
complicity if one had no part in procuring the underlying act pro-
ducing the benefit.' 3 "If the complicity claim is doubtful when the
underlying immorality of the act is clear as with .. . [the] trans-
plants from murder victims, it is considerably weakened when the
act making the benefit possible is legal and its immorality vigor-
ously debated as is the case with abortion.""' 4
b. Legitimizing and Encouraging Abortions
A second objection to the use of electively aborted fetuses is
that medical benefits of fetal tissue research, such as the cure of
Parkinson's disease, will legitimize and encourage abortions." 5 The
potential to save lives would induce women to have abortions who
might not have considered them before." 6 The Stanford Commit-
tee on Ethics examined the inducement-to-abort issue." 7 The com-
mittee concluded that if the inducement to abort could be avoided,
fetal tissue may be ethically used." 8 In order to avoid inducing
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Reverend John C. Rankin of the New England Christian Action
Council in Gloucester, Maine, questions Dr. Robertson's analogy. Rankin points
out that:
No issue is ever raised about a person's possible complicity with the mur-
derer in such a contest. But with abortion, this question is repeatedly
raised .... [T]here is a glaring difference in the definition of 'murder' as
against the law with respect to born human beings, on the one hand, and
the current legality of abortion, on the other hand. Finally, this analogy
kills itself if Robertson wishes to leave his controlling assumption intact.
Namely, if murder and abortion are thus analogically paralleled in terms
of relations to complicity, why are they not parallel in moral terms?
Rankin, The Fetal Tissue Debate on Complicity, 20 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 50
(1990).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Greely, supra note 8, at 1094.
118. Id.
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women to have abortions, the committee suggested that the gov-
ernment disallow any benefit to the mother whatsoever.119 The
Stanford Committee further suggested that the government disal-
low any benefit to the surgeon or institution performing the abor-
tion thereby removing any incentive the physician might otherwise,
have to encourage the abortion. 2 ' The committee decided that the
question to ask in determining whether fetal transplantation is
ethical is: Did the potential use of the tissue encourage the abor-
tion? 21 If the answer is yes, then the uterus is no more than a
factory, and the use of the fetus should not be allowed.'22 If the
answer is no, then the propriety of abortion itself is irrelevant to
subsequent use of the tissue. 2 a
2. The Ethical Issues of Fetal Tissue Research Which Re-
sult From Abortion's Influence
Many ethical issues arise which deal with ways in which abor-
tion affects fetal tissue research. For example, what is the moral
status of the fetus? Can a mother who has decided to abort her
child effectively represent the best interests of the child? Is abort-
ing for the purpose of providing tissue for transplantation ethical?
The future of fetal research is dependent upon the resolution of
these ethical issues.
a. The Moral Status of the Fetus
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was established in
1974 to examine the area of human experimentation.'2 4 In discuss-
ing research on live fetuses, the Commission identified four possi-
ble views concerning the status of the fetus and the implications of
each.'25 The fetus can be considered:
1. As a human being. Proponents of this view would argue either
that personhood begins at conception, because at conception, the
119. Id. A mother cannot sell her aborted fetus under the current regulations.
Humphrey's amendment to the National Organ Transplant Act prevents the sale
of fetal organs and tissues. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (West Supp. 1990).
120. Greely, supra note 8, at 1094.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Special Project, supra note 61, at 968.
125. Id. at 995.
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fetus acquires a soul; or they would argue that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the fetus and an infant.
2. As a piece of tissue. Proponents here would argue the dissimi-
larities of the fetus and adults. The inability to think, communi-
cate, or feel render the fetus more as an organ than a person.
3. As an animal. Proponents here compromise between per-
sonhood status and tissue status. The fetus deserves the respect
given to animals in research such as avoiding unnecessary agony.
4. As a separate class. Proponents view the status of the fetus as
superior to an animal, yet short of the status of an adult. Their
views are based on the underlying issues concerning abortion
rather than the inability of the fetus to "realize its potential."' 26
Before it can be determined whether fetal tissue research
should be permitted, one must determine which of these views of
fetal personhood will be adopted.127 It can then be decided whether
the current methods of fetal transplantation give the fetus the
proper measure of respect. 2 '
Dr. Carson Strong, Associate Professor of Human Values and
Ethics at the University of Tennessee, and Dr. Garland Anderson,
Chief of Maternal Fetal Medicine at the University of Tennessee,
have recently published an article, The Moral Status of the Near-
Term Fetus.2 9 These men suggest that even if one assumes that
the fetus has the status of a person, it does not necessarily follow
that killing the fetus can never be condoned. 3 ° To demonstrate, an
analogy of one who kills in self-defense is used."' One who kills
another because his own life is in danger is morally justified.'32
Thus the mother who aborts because her life is in danger is justi-
fied.' 33 Strong and Anderson stretch their analogy to include one
who kills to protect the life of another."3 If killing to save the life
of another is morally just, then one who aborts her fetus to save
126. Id. at 995-96.
127. Dickson, supra note 108, at 465. The British Polkinghorne Report sug-
gested that a fetus achieves the same moral status as a fully developed person
from the 14th day after conception.
128. See Special Project, supra note 61, at 995.
129. Strong and Anderson, The Moral Status of the Near Term Fetus, 15 J.
MED. ETHIcs 25 (1989).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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the life of another is morally justified.'35 The purpose of the anal-
ogy was to exonerate the inother and the physician respectively
from any moral wrongdoing.136 However, the arguments imply that
simply determining the personhood of a fetus will not settle the
issue of whether procuring tissue from a fetus to save the life of
another is ethically permissible.' 37
b. The Mother's Ability to Consent
Allowing a mother who has decided to abort her fetus to de-
cide whether the fetus may be used for research is one of the most
problematic areas of fetal tissue research.1 3s Under the UAGA, a
mother can legally donate her child's body to a hospital for re-
search. ' 9 She can therefore donate the cadaver of her electively
aborted fetus so that the fetal tissues and organs may be trans-
planted into a recipient.14 ° However, the fetal situation is unique
because the mother is directly responsible for the fetus' death.'
Fetal research opposers argue that because the mother's inten-
tional act will harm the fetus, her interest in aborting the child
conflicts with her ability to act in the child's best interest.'** The
mother's consent is therefore defective. 143
Several arguments counter the defective consent theory. Pro-
fessor Robertson argues that presumptively taking away a mother's
interest in the after-abortion treatment of her fetus would "lead to
a policy of using fetal remains without parental consent or to a
total ban on fetal transplants.' ' 44 Neither result is desirable.' 45
Professor Robertson points out that the defective consent theory is
mistaken on two grounds.' 6 The theory first assumes that the
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Robertson, supra note 73.
139. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-11, 8A U.L.A. 15-67 (West 1983)
[current version at §§ 1-16, 8a U.L.A. 7-27 (West Supp. 1990)].
140. Id.
141. Jonsen, Transplantation of Fetal Tissue: An Ethicist's Viewpoint, 36
CLINICAL RESEARCH 215, 218 (1988).
142. Levine, Fetal Research: The Underlying Issue, 261 SCIENTIFIC AMER.
112 (1989).
143. Jonsen, supra note 141, at 218.
144. Robertson, supra note 73, at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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dead has an interest to protect. '47 Requiring the consent of the
next-of-kin before cadaveric remains may be donated protects the
interests of the next-of-kin, not the decedent."48 Secondly, the the-
ory assumes that the woman no longer has an interest in what hap-
pens to the fetus once it has been aborted.149 Professor Robertson
states, "[als a product of her body and potential heir that she has
for her own compelling reasons chosen to abort, she may care
deeply about whether fetal remains are contributed to research or
therapy to help others."1 50 A woman's interest should therefore be
protected.15
Dr. Albert R. Jonsen, Professor and Chairman of the Depart-
ment of Medical History and Ethics at the University of Washing-
ton, Seattle, takes a more extreme view concerning a mother's abil-
ity to consent. 52 Dr. Jonsen says that consent is not necessary for
the moral acceptability of using cadavers for research and trans-
plantation. 53 Societal requirements of consent stem from our
country's cultural background.' "We are reluctant to have things
done to the dead that they would not have wanted or that are re-
pugnant to the survivors." '55 In fact, some countries view the use
of cadaveric tissue without any consent by the next-of-kin as both
legally and morally acceptable.'15  Dr. Jonsen further points out
that the usual purposes for requiring consent, protecting personal
autonomy, and protection from exploitation and harm, are no
longer relevant when the donor is dead.15 7 The secondary purposes
of the consent requirements, namely respecting the decedent's
prior wishes or the cultural norms, are outweighed by the interests
of saving another life.' 58 The mother's consent is therefore only in-
cidental to the ethical use of the fetal tissue.159
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Jonsen, supra note 141, at 218.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 219.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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c. Aborting for the Purpose of Fetal Transplantation
Another ethical objection to the use of fetal tissue is that
women will abort their fetuses for the purpose of fetal transplanta-
tion and research. ' ° This "slippery slope" argument envisions
women aborting to procure tissue for a sick relative or for mone-
tary gain."' Already in the United States, persons have indicated a
willingness to conceive for transplantation purposes. '62 In 1988,
Ray Leith, whose father had Parkinson's disease, indicated on na-
tional television that she would become pregnant so that the fetus'
tissue could be implanted into her father. 6 3 Her father declined
the offer.' More recently, Mary Ayala became pregnant with the
intention of donating some of the baby's bone marrow to her sev-
enteen-year-old daughter suffering from leukemia.'65 The trans-
plantation will occur after delivery, when the baby is six months
old. 66
Professor Robertson distinguishes between mothers who de-
cide to abort after they have conceived, and those who conceive for
the purpose of aborting.' 67 Currently, deciding to abort after one
becomes pregnant is a legal practice. 168 A pregnant woman may
abort her fetus and donate it to a private research institution for
transplantation procedures.'69 Most proponents of elective abor-
tion accept a woman's decision to abort and donate the fetal tissue
to research. 7 ° However, these proponents decline to accept con-
ceiving for abortion as morally permissible.' 7' Purposefull concep-
tion and abortion to obtain the fetal tissue denigrates the status of
the fetus as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.'72
Therefore, in order to prevent abuse, these proponents propose
160. Mahowald, Placing Wedges Along a Slippery Slope: Use of Fetal Neu-
ral Tissue for Transplantation, 36 CLINICAL RESEARCH 220, 222 (1988).
161. Id.
162. Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death; New Uses of Fetuses and
Brain-Absent Babies Trouble Doctors, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Trafford, Brave New Reasons for Mothering, WASHINGTON POST
HEALTH, Feb. 27, 1990, at 6.
166. Id.
167. Robertson, supra note 73, at 7-8.
168. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169. See supra note 139.
170. Robertson, supra note 73, at 7-8.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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that the government ban all intrafamilial fetal transplantations
and restrict the right of the mother to designate a recipient.,"
However, deciding to abort after the onset of pregnancy is also us-
ing the fetus as a means to an end.174 "As long as abortion of an
existing pregnancy for transplant purposes is ethically accepted,
conceiving in order to abort and procure tissue for transplant
should also be ethically acceptable when necessary to alleviate
great suffering in others."' 75 Furthermore, if abortions performed
when the mother's life is at risk are morally unobjectionable, those
performed to procurecompatible tissue for the mother who suffers
from a terminal disease should be morally acceptable as well. 176
Another criticism of aborting with the intent to donate the fe-
tal tissue is that the method of abortion used could depend on the
decision to donate. 177 If the success of the transplantation depends
upon the age of the fetus, the mother intending to donate her fetus
would have to carry the fetus until the proper time.'78 She would
then be subjected to the method of abortion which would produce
the most intact cadaveric tissue.7 9 The government does not allow
procedures to be used which increase the risk to the mother or the
fetus solely for the sake of the activity.'80 If the abortion can be
performed in a way that produces better tissue samples, yet poses
no additional risk to the mother, women might be pressured to
adopt this technique. 8 '
Any statutes restricting the methods of abortion will not be
effective until after the third month of pregnancy. 82 Roe v. Wade
determined that the state's compelling interest in protecting the
mother does not begin until the end of the first trimester.1 83 Dur-
ing the first three months, a woman is free to choose the method of
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. "If the opportunity to use fetal tissue to preserve or save actual life is
denied, we would be demeaning and devaluating actual life by denying it the help
it needs, and thus ironically viewing potential life more than actual life."
Spielberg, Letter to the Editor, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1609 (1989).
177. Mahowald, supra note 160, at 221.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(2) (1989).
181. Annas, supra note 104, at 1081.
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
183. Id.
[Vol. 13:81
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol13/iss1/3
FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH
abortion to be used.1"4 If the mother intends to donate the fetus
for transplantation, her choice of abortion methods will most likely
be the method which produces the best fetal tissue samples. 185
Fetal transplantation opponents fear that the procedure will
become commercialized.' 86 The National Organ Transplant Act
prohibits the sale of organs, including fetal remains.'87 Any com-
mercialization of the fetal cadavers is therefore currently illegal. 88
Of course, the regulation cannot prevent the illegal sale of fetal
remains which some commentators feel will happen.8 9 The Stan-
ford Committee feels that a black market for fetal organs is highly
unlikely. 9 ° "Unlike street drugs, fetal tissue would not be self ad-
ministered. Medical intervention would be necessary."'"' As long
as the transplanting physicians act lawfully and use only the tissue
from legitimate sources, the danger of a black market is
nonexistent.192
THE FUTURE OF FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH
The future of fetal research depends upon the future of abor-
tion because abortion is the source of tissue for fetal research. By
controlling the abortion issue, a government can control the use of
electively aborted fetal tissue. Internationally, countries such as
Canada and Britain have approved of fetal tissue research. In the
United States, the government and all of its regulations will ulti-
mately determine the future of fetal tissue research.
A. The Future of Abortion
The future of abortion is not as settled now as it was in 1973,
when the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade. 9 ' In 1989, the Su-
preme Court attacked Roe for the first time in the case of Webster
184. Id.
185. Mahowald, supra note 160, at 221.
186. 135 CONG. REc. E4066 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
187. Murphy, The Ethics of Research Using Human Fetal Tissue, 321 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1608 (1989).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Greely and Raffin, Letter to the Editor, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1610
(1989).
191. Id.
192. "Although some organs are scarce and potentially very valuable, we have
seen no black market of human organs in the United States." Id.
193. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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v. Reproductive Health Services.1 4 In a plurality opinion, the
Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring a physician to determine
the viability of a fetus before performing an abortion. 95 The Court
also rejected the trimester approach of Roe for determining when a
state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling.196 In up-
holding the Missouri statute, the Court gave states more power to
regulate abortion than it had given in the past. 9 ' With the con-
servative majority present in the Supreme Court today (O'Connor,
Scalia, White, Kennedy and Rehnquist), it will be interesting to
see whether the court will extend a state's power to regulate abor-
tion even further-perhaps even to overrule Roe v. Wade.19s
A bill was introduced to Congress in response to the Webster
decision on November 17, 1989.1"9 The Freedom of Choice Act of
1989 proposes to codify the Roe v. Wade decision in order to pro-
tect a woman's right to abort from extensive regulation by the
states. 00 "To the extent that Webster both invites and approves
194. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
195. Id. at 3054-58.
196. Id. at 3056-57.
197. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
198. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
199. 135 CONG. REC. S16024. The text of the Freedom of Information Act of
1989 is as follows:
Section 1. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "Freedom of Choice Act of 1989".
Section 2. Right to Choose
(a) In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), a state may not
restrict the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy
(1) before fetal viability; or
(2) at any time if such termination is necessary to protect the
life or health of the woman.
(b) Medically Necessary Requirements- A State may impose require-
ments medically necessary to protect the life or health of the woman re-
ferred to in subsection (a).
Section 3. Definition of State
As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the District of Colum-
bia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each other territory or pos-
session of the United States.
135 CONG. REC. S16051-52 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989)(statement of Senator
Packwood).
200. "With the Court's decision in Webster last July, the protection for a
woman's right to choose was placed in serious jeopardy . . . .The Court invited
the States to place restrictions on the rights of women - and many states are
attempting to do so." 135 Cong. Rec. S16052 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989)(statement
of Senator Packwood).
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erosion of the Roe rights, this legislation is intended to reverse the
impact of that decision." ' The Freedom of Choice Act of 1989
provides that "(a) state may not restrict the constitutional right of
a woman to choose". 202 Whether or not the bill is adopted, Webster
gives the states more authority to regulate abortion than they had
in the past.20 If states choose to regulate abortion more actively,
they will indirectly regulate fetal tissue research as well.
B. International Treatment of Fetal Research
Fetal tissue research is unsettled internationally just as it is in
the United States. Some countries such as Germany have banned
all fetal tissue research. 04 Others, like Canada, have yet to adopt
any kind of policy regarding fetal tissue research.0 5 Britain, how-
ever, has approved fetal research.20 The guidelines assembled by
the Polkinghorne Committee, a committee set up to review issues
involving fetal research, have been adopted.20 7 In approving fetal
research, the committee concluded, "[wie do not believe that in
circumstances of such moral complexity it is right to regard the
termination of pregnancy as inevitably so heinous that any subse-
quent use of the fetal tissue thereby made available is morally dis-
qualified."20 8 Unless an international consensus can be reached on
these issues, people will simply travel to another county to receive
fetal transplantations not available in their own country.
C. Future Treatment in the United States
Will the United States follow the Thatcher administration's
adoption of the Polkinghorne Committee's proposal and adopt the
NIH panel's conclusions? Probably not.20 9 Scientists are reluctant
to press the issue for fear that the Bush administration would ban
the research. 1 Scientists are waiting until a more liberal adminis-
201. 135 CONG. REC. S16051 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989)(statement of Senator
Cranston).
202. See supra note 200.
203. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 2040 (1989).
204. Kirk, Germany to Ban Embryo Use, 245 SCIENCE 464 (1989).
205. Lowy, Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Time for a Canadian Policy, 141
C.M.A.J. 1227 (1989).
206. See Dickson, supra note 108.
207. Id. at 464.
.208. Id. at 465.
209. Id. at 464.
210. Id. at 465.
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tration comes into office. 211 However, their waiting may be in vain.
While President Reagan was in office, the Assistant Secretary
of Health, Robert Windom, issued a moratorium on all federally
funded research involving the transplantation of dead fetal mate-
rial.212 The Assistant Secretary appointed a NIH panel to review
legal and ethical issues involved in fetal research. 213 However, just
days before the panel was scheduled to convene, Gary Bauer, assis-
tant to the President for policy developments, drafted an executive
order calling for a complete ban on all federally funded fetal tissue
research.214 When news of the draft hit the press, the White House
brushed the order off as a "first cut" that "[did] not represent Ad-
ministration policy or a presidential decision in any way." 215 The
presidential order was "postponed. 2 1
Although Robert Windom is no longer in office, the morato-
rium remains in effect.217 On November 2, 1989, the Bush Admin-
istration formally extended the moratorium. 21 The Secretary of
Health and Human Services, Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, stated,
"[a]fter carefully reviewing all of the materials, I am persuaded
that one must accept the likelihood that permitting the human fe-
tal tissue research at issue will increase the incidence of abortion
across the country. 21  Dr. Sullivan therefore extended the morato-
rium indefinitely. 220
In response to the ban, Representative Henry Waxman intro-
duced the Research Freedom Act of 1990 to the House on August
3, 1990.2' This Act proposes to overturn the existing ban on fetal
tissue research. 2 2 The Act also proposes to codify the recommen-
211. Id.
212. See Culliton, Panel Backs Fetal Tissue Research, 242 SCIENCE 1625
(1988).
213. Id.
214. Culliton, White House Wants Fetal Research Ban, 241 SCIENCE 1423
(1988).
215. Id.
216. Palaca, Row Over White House Moves to Ban Fetal Tissue Research,
335 NATURE 197 (1988).
217. Fetal Tissue Research Ban Formally Extended; Moral and Ethical
Problems Said to Outweigh Possible Benefits, Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1989, at
5.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 136 CONG. REC. S2643 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990).
222. Id.
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dations of the National Institute of Health advisory panel.223 Anti-
abortionists are adamently opposing the bill.2 24 Dr. Sullivan ex-
pects President Bush to veto the bill.225 With the moratorium
seemingly locked in place, the progress of fetal tissue research in
the United States will continue to be severely limited.226
CONCLUSION
The year is 1990. There is no fetal tissue bank. There is no
fetal-farm-for money in Nicaragua. The anonymous sufferer of
Parkinson's disease must continue to suffer, with only levodopa,
bromocriptine, and orphenadrine hydrochloride to relieve his
symptoms. 2 7 His hopes of obtaining a successful fetal brain tissue
transplantation within his lifetime are nil. Unless the government
decides to lift the moratorium and fund the fetal tissue research,
thousands of other Parkinsonian patients will suffer the same fate
as the anonymous recipient above.
The future of fetal tissue transplantation research is insepara-
ble from the influence of abortion. The tissue used comes from
abortions. Abortion procedures determine the useability of the fe-
tal tissue. The mother aborting the fetus must consent to its use in
research. Some women are aborting for the purpose of obtaining
the tissue for transplantation. Societal attitudes towards abortion
will determine the societal acceptance or nonacceptance of fetal
tissue research. Persons opposed to abortion are fighting vehe-
mently against the use of fetal tissues for transplantation. A small
victory in the war against abortion was won when Assistant Secre-
tary Windom imposed a moratorium on all federally funded re-
search dealing with dead fetuses. Without government funding, re-
searchers' progress has been and will continue to be limited.
The government is looking at the fetal tissue research issue
with blinders on. Much more than the right of a woman to abort
her baby needs to be examined when determining whether or not
fetal tissue research will be allowed to have a future. The focus
must be shifted from the rightness or wrongness of abortion to the
preservation of lives of other existing human beings. As long as
223. Id.; see supra note 22.
224. Preview/Fetal Research Bill; Waxman Seeks to Restore U.S. Funds for
Human Cell Studies, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 8, 1990, Part A, at 5, col.4.
225. Id.
226. See supra note 221.
227. See Lindvall, supra note 27.
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abortion is legal, one's views concerning abortion are irrelevant to
the legality of fetal tissue research. If the government does not rec-
ognize a fetus's right not to be aborted, i.e. it's rights to life, then
how can it recognize a right in the fetus not to be used in scientific
research once it is dead? Such a position appears logically inconsis-
tent. Rather than haggle over abortion, the government should
take an active role in the new line of research. The research is go-
ing to continue in private institutions regardless of whether or not
the government funds it. The government has an interest in seeing
that procedures used on the recipients are carried out properly. If
the government will provide federal funding, then it will have a
direct voice in procedures to be used in the transplantation pro-
cess. "The world is watching, and this opportunity to demonstrate
good science, good ethics, and compassionate patient care should
not be wasted. 228
Angela M. Skerrett
228. Annas, supra note 104, at 1082.
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